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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TAJ BECKER, MD, 
Plaintiff-Appellant pro se, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCE 
(MEDICAID), 
Case No. 20060495 - CA 
Defendant - Appellee 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF TO DEFENDANT/APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (West 2004). On May 31, 2006, the Utah Supreme 
Court transferred this action to this Court pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. R 595, 648. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
1. Plaintiff did not fail to marshall evidence in support of the district court's 
decision that the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (hereafter MFCU) was not an agent of 
Medicaid (see p. 1-5 of Appellant's Brief). The District Court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law did not cite any precedent case law in its support and 
Plaintiff/Appellant (hereafter Becker) could only surmise that the Court's findings were 
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based on the entire court record, the trial testimony and the contract language itself, 
including the Code of Federal Regulations (hereafter CFR), Utah Statutes and Medicaid 
CFR regulations, etc. She did so in a manner most favorable to the District Court. 
2. The issue of agency was decidedly not "the sole issue addressed at the bench 
trial" as claimed by Medicaid. Moreover, the state defendant in his brief (p. 2) correctly 
cites the Standard of Review: "The question of whether an agency relationship exists is 
one of fact which we review for an abuse of discretion." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 
305 (Utah 1998). However, the court below did not entertain that issue under its "Finding 
of Facts". Rather, the existence of agency was rejected by the District Court exclusively 
under "Conclusions of Law": # 3, 4, 6, 7, 10. 
Dr. Becker alleges that the trial court incorrectly interpreted and applied the plain 
language of the laws, federal regulations and state statute thereby committing substantial 
and prejudicial error and abuse of discretion. See Pena, 869 P. 2d at 936, Utah 1994. 
In addition to the agency issue, the honorable District Court by its finding of Fact 
#5 also ruled that during the MFCU's investigation Dr. Becker requested that the MFCU 
request that Medicaid review the MFCU's initial determination [of Dr, Becker's 
upcoding/false claims], and that Medicaid folly complied with the MFCU's request and 
agreed in their response that Dr. Becker did indeed overcharge Medicaid, a potential 
felony. 
In its conclusions of law #7 the court below further found that this communication 
from Medicaid to the MFCU implicating Dr. Becker with a potential Second Degree 
Felony (subsequently thus filed by the MFCU) did not"... impose any duty on the 
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Defendant under the Provider Agreement" [Contract], and therefore; #11, "Medicaid met 
all its legal and contractual duties to provide Defendant (sic) due process, including 
notice and an opportunity to be heard." 
Continuing with conclusion of law #12, the court below found that after trial 
testimony ... "Plaintiff has failed to prove any breach of contract by Defendant or any 
damages caused to Plaintiff by Defendant." - dismissing Plaintiffs complaint on the 
merits. 
The above is offered as rebuttal to the state's claim that agency was the sole issue 
ruled on by the district court. 
3. Defendant-Appellee's STATEMENT OF THE CASE erroneously cites (Rl 1) 
of the complaint as indicating that Dr. Becker alleges "...breaches of the contract were 
the actions of the MFCU, not any actions of the Defendant." 
What Dr. Becker's complaint actually states there is that Defendant-Appellee 
DOH-Medicaid by acquiescence and custom...wrongfully delegated a duty reasonably 
relied upon by the Plaintiff to its non-compliant agent-designee (MFCU) which deprived 
Plaintiff of a material part of her bargain, breaking the bilateral contract and resulting in 
major damages. 
This, inter alia, clearly states that Becker alleges breach of contract by Medicaid 
and not by the MFCU which is not a party to the case at bar. The District Court's earlier 
ruling denying the Defendant-Appellee's Motion to Dismiss and Change of Venue under 
RCP 12(b)(6) and 19 (signed by the Honorable Judge Beacham April 7,2003) clearly and 
properly held: 
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"The purpose of the rule is to insure that the interests of absent parties are 
protected and to avoid multiple litigation or inconsistent judicial determinations. 
Grand County v. Rogers, 44 P3d 734, 740 (Utah 2002). 
"UDOH has not shown that MFCU has any interest in the outcome of this case. 
The cause of action involves a claim of breach of contract between UDOH and Dr. 
Becker. While MFCU may have acted inappropriately during its investigation of 
Dr. Becker, it is only the breach of contract claim that is present before the court. 
While agents of the MFCU may be called on as witnesses in the case, their 
presence is not necessary to determine whether DOH acted in a manner contrary to 
its alleged contract with Dr. Becker. Consequently, MFCU is not an indispensable 
party and the Motion to Dismiss under Rule 19 is denied." [ADDENDUM A] 
Moreover, Dr. Becker rejects Defendant-Appellee's misleading footnote (2) - p. 3 
which alleges that her federal claims against the MFCU on unrelated constitutional 
issues [First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments] "... arise out of the same 
circumstances as does the current contract claim against the Department of Health." 
Medicaid or it's personnel is not a defendant in the federal case. 
4. Dr. Becker agrees with the lower Court's finding of facts 1 through 5, most 
importantly #5 which clearly found that Medicaid during the MFCU's investigation 
reported, in answer to the MFCU's request, that Becker had up-coded and that there was 
possible fraud. The "during the MFCU investigation" time period is 1998 - 1999 and not 
to be confused with Medicaid's much later untimely reporting that finding to Dr. Becker 
years later in December, 2000, at which time the MFCU litigation had already concluded 
in Dr. Becker's favor. 
5. Dr. Becker in her Brief to the Appeals Court has already adequately 
challenged the State's assertion that the MFCU or Medicaid is financed by the Federal 
Centers for Medicare/Medicaid (hereafter CMS) or CMS's Inspector General. 
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6. Dr. Becker has demonstrated at length during trial and in her complaint and 
motions that she views the MFCU as an (apparent) agent of Medicaid for the exclusive 
issue of the constructive notice to Medicaid of Dr. Becker's alleged upcoding. Becker's 
reliance was chiefly based on representations made by the MFCU and assent by Medicaid 
to these representations. The Defendant-Appellee misstated Medicaid's Mr. Steven 
Gatzemeier's testimony as having advised Dr. Becker that the MFCU and Medicaid 
"...were independent entities." (Trial Transcript 171:17 R 601:171-72). Mr. Gatzemeier 
used the term "bifurcated" which is not a synonym to independent! 
In any event, many of Mr. Gatzemeier's assertions were found by Dr. Becker not 
to comport with the facts and she did not take these as controlling her own findings. 
7. Contrary to the Defendant-Appellee's averments in his brief, Dr. Becker does 
not anywhere seek to hold Medicaid/DOH liable for alleged misconduct by the MFCU. 
As a matter of fact, she would have had no reason to even mention the MFCU in this 
breach of contract case had it not been for Medicaid's years-long concealment and denial 
of the crucial fact- (now admitted by the defense and court below) - that Medicaid had 
itself confirmed MFCU's early (1998-1999) request related to the fraud unit's 
preliminary allegation that Dr. Becker had submitted false claims by up-coding. 
Medicaid's 1998-1999 notice of Dr. Becker's culpability mandated the CFR's 
unambiguous Medicaid duty to conduct a preliminaiy investigation to confirm or reject 
the allegation. If confirmed, as in this case, the violation must be communicated to the 
accused "promptly" for repayment and demand that the accused bring her "burden of 
Appellate No.200604 95:Pltf Reply Memo 5 
proof to Medicaid as per Contractual Agreement: See CFR § 455.14 and Provider 
Agreement B-2. 
In addition, Medicaid likewise failed to perform its duty by denying Dr. Becker 
the opportunity to give evidence of her innocence at the lowest level under Utah 
Administrative Code R410-14-1; Utah Administrative Procedures Act 63-46-bl(4)(a) and 
by the promises of Medicaid's controlling 1998 Provider Manual, all admitted parts of 
the contract (5.210 Administrative Hearing). 
8. Medicaid's revelations to the MFCU that Becker was fraudulently upcoding 
gave a decisive and foreseeable impetus to the MFCU's decision to prosecute. The 
resultant costly, fruitless litigation v. Becker only relates to her claimed damages 
accountable to Medicaid's breach alone. Damages was an issue not reached by the court 
below because it found no breach of contract existed. 
As pleaded at length, Plaintiff decidedly does not base her claim for breach upon 
agency, a theory which she advanced in order to show that Medicaid had constructive 
notice of Dr. Becker's upcoding; - and a duty to respond as per contract, notwithstanding 
any legal or illegal action pursued by the MFCU separately. See Addendum B., Becker's 
7/7/99 letter to the MFCU (Kroll), requesting MFCU to notify Medicaid of the alleged 
up-coding* 
9. Dr. Becker does not anywhere contest the authority of the MFCU to lawfully 
acquire her coding information and medical charts in order to investigate for Medicaid 
crime or abuse as indicated in the contract and controlling CFRs. 
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10. Supporting case law listed in Defendant's brief primarily referred to agency 
related questions on appeal from a lower court's summary judgment. 
In Bank Salt Lake v. Corp, President cited by Defendant Appellee, the Utah 
Supreme Court relied on Utah's Uniform Commercial Code § 70A-1-201 as defining the 
criteria for "notice": 
[39] The pertinent provisions of § 70A-1-201, U.C.A. 1953, as amended are: 
[40] (25) A person has actual "notice" of a fact when 
[41] (a) he has actual knowledge of it; or 
[42] (b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or 
[43] (c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in 
question he has reason to know that it exists. 
[44] A person "knows" or has "knowledge" of a fact when he has actual 
knowledge of it. "Discover" or "learn" or a word or phrase of similar 
import refers to knowledge rather than to reason to know. The time and 
circumstances under which a notice or notification may cease to be 
effective are not determined by this act. 
[45] (26) A person "notifies" or "gives" a notice or a notification to another by 
taking such steps as may be reasonably required to inform the other in 
ordinary course whether or not such other actually comes to know if it. A 
person "receives" a notice or notification when 
[46] (a) it comes to his attention; or 
[47] (b) it is duly delivered at the place of business through which the 
contract was made or at any other place held out by him as the place for 
receipt of such communications. 
11. Undisputedly, according to the surprise trial testimony, both Medicaid 
(Gatzemeier) and the MFCU (Kroll) concur that prior to any litigation filed v. Dr. 
Becker, Medicaid had notice and active participation satisfying the above U.C.C.'s 
requirements. 
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The Honorable 5th District Judge likewise acknowledged this fact in his 
"FINDINGS OF FACT #5. 
Setting the agency issue aside, while not conceding, PlaintifI7Appellant Dr. 
Becker, alleges again that these admissions alone clearly establish Medicaid's breach of 
contract as cited in her brief (see inter alia^Contract B-2)CFR§ 455.14 . 
12. Contrary to Defendant-Appellee's claim, Dr. Becker has fully shown the legal 
insufficiency supporting the District Court's finding (pp. xx and xxi of Plaintifl7 
Appellant's brief). 
Plaintiff has also shown that the MFCU routinely conducted its modus operandi 
(e.g. representing Medicaid) with the assent of the principal as manifest in their 
operations manual with the MFCU wherein Medicaid designated the MFCU as their 
agent for the special purposes: "DHCF [Division of Health Care Finance-which is 
Medicaid] designates MFCU and its personnel as duly authorized agents of DHCF for 
purposes of reasonable or immediate access as defined in the Provider Agreement for 
Medicaid and UMAP, to provider records and facilities for detection, investigation, or 
prosecution of fraud..." (emphasis supplied). (See Trial Transcript 242:14 and 
Addendum C). 
Defendant-Appellee and the District Court both assert that any agency relationship 
between the MFCU and Medicaid is "prohibited by law..." Defendant-Appellee refers to 
CFR § 1007.9(a) as the 'law' which supposedly prohibits agency: "The Unit must be 
separate and distinct from the Medicaid agency." 
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Defendant-Appellee thereafter in his Brief misstates and confuses the term 
"distinct" with "independent". However, these terms are not interchangeable or related 
and the attempt is misleading. 
13. Dr. Becker's reliance on an MFClPs special/apparent agent or designee status 
was prudent and reasonable for the sole purpose of establishing constructive notice to 
Medicaid of alleged fraudulent Medicaid billing by her as claimed by the MFCU's 
subpoena duces tecum in aid of a criminal investigation in 1998. [Addendum D] 
14. The Defendant-Appellee's assertion (p. 13 of Appellee's Brief) that the 
MFCU's proffered Settlement Agreement to Dr. Becker (Addendum D of Defendant-
Appellee's brief), clearly identifies ("Medicaid") as a short form abbreviation for the 
MFCU is disingenuous. The single term 'Medicaid' is used throughout the 5 page 
settlement proposal. Notably especially in #9 of the proposal "No sanction: [1] Medicaid 
and the [2] State of Utah agree that nothing herein shall be construed as a sanction upon 
Becker, (emphasis and [1] and [2] supplied). Only DOH-Medicaid can 'sanction' a 
physician, i.e. exclude him from the Medicaid program (See CFR § 455.16 (c)(4). The 
MFCU has no such authority. 
[1] "Medicaid* here refers to DOH-Medicaid while the [2] 'State of Utah' 
represents the MFCU which seeks to offer a settlement agreement asserting it would 
bind not only the State MFCU but also the assenting and included Medicaid agency to 
its terms. 
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This clearly evidences the MFCU's asserted power and agency in behalf of 
Medicaid by their mutual collaboration "agreeing]" to settle the matter - a collaboration 
mandated by the CFR § 455.21 (a)(3). (Appellant's Brief Addendum B). 
These facts satisfy all the prongs ofLuddington cited by Appellee in his 
brief Indeed, Dr. Becker would have been unjustifiably amiss in construing that an 
agency relationship did not exist. 
15. Dr. Becker has already treated her opposition to Defendant's assumption that 
by law the MFCU is independent from DOH-Medicaid which Defendant apparently 
based on the word "distinct" in the CFR. 
Hereafter in his Brief, Defendant-Appellee abandons the term 'distinct' in his 
Brief and instead interjects the misleading term 'independent' throughout his argument. 
However, Black's Law Dictionary, 5* Edition p. 425, citing Gavin v. Webb, Tex, Civ. 
App., 99 S.W. 2d 372, 379., does not include 'independent' in its summary of several 
interchangeable terms under 'distinct'. 
Indeed, hundreds of private and governmental entities are 'distinct' and by no 
means independent of their controlling departments, - e.g. Medicaid under DOH, etc. 
16. As to Defendant-Appellee's reiteration of the punctuation issue in the contract, 
Dr. Becker has already admitted her error (see appellant's brief pp. 4 & 5) under 
"Marshalling the Pro-Court argument". 
17. Defendant-Appellee's assertion (Brief p. 16) that "...Plaintiff failed to present 
any evidence in the district court that established an agency relationship..." is folly 
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controverted, - inter alia, - by the trial transcript: 216:15 to 22,224:11 to 226:7,242:14-
23, 243:10-17, 254:10-23, 271:2-8, 246:10-11, and 245:13-16. 
Plaintiff-Appellant's CONCLUSION 
Appellant/Plaintiff (Becker) has offered abundant colorable evidence that the 
MFCU presented itself as a collaborative special/apparent agent of Medicaid. Medicaid, 
in turn, was aware that the MFCU was negotiating a settlement to which they assented to 
be bound by (Trial transcript 50:3 - to - 56:3). This is clearly a manifestation of the 
principal Medicaid to allow its 'distinct' apparent agent to operate in its behalf and to 
Medicaid's monetary benefit 
Dr. Becker maintains that the lower court and Defendant-Appellee's procedure to 
obfuscate this contract suit between Dr. Becker and DOH-Medicaid into a suit 
exclusively depending on the existence of agency is the dominant fallacy in this case. 
Once more, Dr. Becker was compelled to pursue the theory of apparent agency 
exclusively to substantiate that the early 1998-1999 up-coding allegation from the MFCU 
to Medicaid gave Medicaid constructive notice of Becker's possible fraudulent billings, 
thereby triggering Medicaid's contractual duty of a preliminary investigation, i.e. request 
to make restitution or to bring her "burden of proof to show the correctness of her 
coding/billing (Contract B-2). Nowhere does she seek to join or hold the MFCU 
responsible. She only alleges breach of contract by Medicaid. 
The honorable Court of Appeals need not even visit the agency issue which is now 
practically obviated by trial testimony implicating Medicaid directly in 1998-1999. 
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That undisputed trial testimony established that Medicaid secretly issued a finding 
of Dr. Becker's culpability to the MFCU at the start of the criminal investigation (1998-
1999) transmitted to the MFCU. This was done without notice to her and deprived her of 
a very material contractual right (Contract B-2) which would possibly have been a 
substantial motive for Becker to consider a civil settlement as proposed by the MFCU at 
the time, obviating litigation. 
Trial testimony further established that no law or rule existed to prevent Medicaid 
from performing this contractual duty to promptly inform Dr. Becker and invite her to 
produce exculpatory evidence at the lowest level (R410-14-1) [A part of the Contract]. 
Most importantly, Medicaids Brief and the Court below in it's decision has failed 
to overcome Medicaid's clear obligation and unambiguous mandated duty to under CFR 
§ 455.14: [A part of the contract] 
"If the agency receives a complaint of Medicaid fraud or abuse from any 
source or identifies any questionable practices it must conduct a 
preliminary investigation..,." 
Moreover: Utah Administrative Procedures Act 63-46 bl(4)(a) [A part of the Contract]: 
(4) "This chapter does not preclude any agency, prior to the beginning of 
an adjudicative proceeding, or the presiding officer during an 
adjudicative proceeding from: 
(a) requesting or ordering conferences with both parties...to: 
(i) encourage settlement; 
(ii) clarify the issues; 
(iii) simplify the evidence; 
(iv) facilitate discovery; 
(v) expedite the proceedings..." 
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Medicaid clearly failed in their duty of the agreement, callously and in bad faith, 
and thereby breached the contract. 
For the stated reasons, Dr. Becker respectfully prays that the Honorable Utah 
Court of Appeals reverse the Dismissal by the Fifth District Court which was ordered 
against the clear weight of the trial evidence, erroneous and unsupported by the record in 
a light most favorable to the trial court's determination. 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT REQUESTS ORAL ARGUMENT AND A PUBLISHED 
OPINION. 
Respectfully submitted this / / day of December, 2006 
' A/ J^CJCM/ 
PlaintiflMppellant pro se, Taj Becker; M.D. 
Appellate No.20060495:Pltf Reply Memo 13 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the fi^day of December , 2006, two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF TO 
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE'S BRIEF were mailed, postage prepaid Certified Mail with 
Return Receipt Requested, to the following: 
BRENT A. BURNETT (4003) 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
Hand Delivered 
Mailed, overnight delivery 
Faxed 
Taj Becker, M.D., Plaintiff Pro Se 
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ADDENDUM "A 
I I I > « - * 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CpTOTFOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAJ BECKER, MD, 
Plaintiff Pro Se, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE 
FINANCE (MEDICAID); Rod Betit, 
Executive Director, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
AND CHANGE OF VENUE 
Civil No. 020501574 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to a Motion to Dismiss and Change of Venue 
filed by Defendant on January 27, 2003 Plaintiff filed her Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motions on February 4, 2003 
Having reviewed the parties' memoranda, having reviewed the relevant law, and being fully 
advised in the premises, the court now rules as follows* 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff, Taj Becker, M D , (hereinafter "Dr Becker") is a Utah licensed Neurologist who 
practices in St George On September 25, 1994, Dr, Becker entered into an agreement with 
Defendant, Utah Division of Health (Medicaid), (hereinafter "UDOH") to be a provider of Medicaid 
services On November 17,1998, the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, (hereinafter "MFCIT), obtained 
a large number of Dr Becker's patient medical records for review Subsequently, MFCU alleged that 
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Dr. Becker's records revealed some coding errors that were higher than an examination of the 
patient's notes warranted. MFCU used these records to infer that Dr. Becker had filed similar 
erroneous claims over a five year period resulting in a repayment and penalty assessment of $680,000. 
This was eventually reduced to $3 5,000 with continued investigation of Dr. Becker's medical records. 
Dr. Becker requested, and was denied, an administrative hearing of the claims made against her. 
On June 24. 1999, a civil suit was filed against Dr. Becker. This civil case was later dismissed 
without prejudice on July 8, 1999 and a criminal case was filed against Dr. Becker. The criminal case 
was dismissed with prejudice on September 6, 2000. 
On August 14, 2002, Dr. Becker filed this lawsuit against UDOH, citing a breach of the 
contract entered into by the parties. Dr. Becker alleges that UDOH breached the contract by 
allowing MFCU to perform an investigation and subsequently to file a civil suit against Dr. Becker 
and by failing to provide an administrative review of the situation as required by the contract. 
MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO RULES 12(b)(6) AND 19 
The bases of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss under Rules 12(b)(6) and 19 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure are insufficient to approve of the motions. In each circumstance, the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure has a test that must be met and, in each case, Defendant fails to make a showing 
that the test is met. 
Under Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a case may be dismissed if the plaintiff 
has failed to join an indispensable party. UDOH argues that Dr. Becker has failed to join all of the 
indispensable parties in the case by her failure to include MFCU as a party to the case. Rule 19(a) 
explains that a party is necessary if: 
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he 
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition 
of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect 
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that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of 
incurring double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed 
interest. 
The purpose of the rule is to insure that the interests of absent parties are protected and to avoid 
multiple litigation or inconsistent judicial determinations. Grand County v. Rogers, 44 P. 3d 734, 740 
(Utah 2002). 
UDOH has not shown that MFCU has any interest in the outcome of this case. The cause of 
action involves a claim of breach of a contract between UDOH and Dr. Becker. While MFCU may 
have acted inappropriately during its investigation of Dr. Becker, it is only the breach of contract 
claim, that is present before the court. While agents of MFCU may be called on as witnesses in the 
case, their presence is not necessary to determine whether UDOH acted in a manner contrary to its 
alleged contract with Dr. Becker. Consequently, MFCU is not an indispensable party and the Motion 
to Dismiss under Rule 19 is denied. 
UDOH also alleges that Dr. Becker's claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted. In its Rule 12(b)(6) motion, UDOH argues that Dr. Becker is 
unable to make a claim as there was no contract between Dr. Becker and UDOH and that no 
relationship existed between UDOH and MFCU that would make UDOH liable for MFCU's actions. 
This argument, however, does not meet the requirements for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In determining 
the validity of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "the court must construe the complaint in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor," Mounteer v. Utah Power 
&LightCo., 823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991); Arrow Indus, v. Zions First Nat1'IBank, 767P.2d 
935, 938 (Utah 1988). The Court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and 
consider them and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. Russell v. The Standard Corporation, 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995). Thus, the Court 
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must accept Dr. Becker's claim that a contract existed between the parties and that MFCU was an 
agent of UDOH. Therefore, UDOH's Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is denied. 
MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE 
UDOH has also filed a Motion for Change of Venue, stating that the Fifth District Court is 
an improper venue under § 78-13-9 of the Utah Code. Section 78-13-9 allows a court to change the 
place of trial for several reasons, including when the county designated in the complaint is not the 
proper county and when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by 
the change. UDOH argues that the action should be heard in Salt Lake County, on the basis of Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-17, which allows actions against the state to be brought in either Salt Lake 
County or the county in which the claim arose. 
The law allows a plaintiff to chose the court in which to bring her claim, as long as the place 
of venue is related to the contract and the contract itself does not have a provision limiting the proper 
venue In this case, § 63-30-17 takes the place of a venue selection clause of the contract. The 
Legislature has limited the proper venue for contractual claims against the state to the county where 
the contract arose or Salt Lake County. 
UDOH argues that Salt Lake County, the site of the denial of the administrative hearing, is 
the only proper venue because Dr. Becker's claim arises from UDOH's failure to provide an 
administrative hearing. This argument follows a limited view of Dr. Becker's claims. Dr. Becker 
claims that the contractual relationship between the parties was breached not only by UDOH's failure 
to have the administrative review, but also UDOH's failure to facilitate a preliminary investigation 
prior to the administrative review and UDOH's failure to properly supervise MFCU in their 
investigation. The MFCU investigation of Dr. Becker's medical records occurred, and UDOH's 
alleged failure to perform a preliminary investigation would have occurred, in Washington County. 
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Therefore, Washington County is a proper venue as it is the county in which the claim arose. UDOH 
has not made any significant claims of inconvenience, especially as the medical records from which 
the investigation first arose remain in Washington County. Since Dr. Becker was entitled to choose 
either Washington County or Salt Lake County, the Motion for Change of Venue is denied. 
Dated this 7 day of April, 2003. 
G. RAND BEACHAM, District Court Judge 
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ADDENDUM "B 
TAJ N. BECKER, M.D. 
Neurology 
Dipiomate, Ameripan Board of Psychiatry and Neurology 
630 South 400 East, Suite # 102 
St. George, UT 84770 
phone (801) 688-7800 / fax (801) 688-7801 
7/7/99 
Mr. J. Denis Kroll 
Medicaid Fraud Control Unit 
State of Utah 
5272 S. College Dr. #200 
Murray, UT 84123-2611 
Dear Mr. Kroll: 
This is to inform you that I have decided NOT to settle the legal action initiated against 
me by the State of Utah arising from the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit's criminal 
investigation of my medical practice upon careful review of your latest proposal dated 
6/24/99. 
I am fully aware of the loss of time and the many tens of thousands of dollar expenses I 
will incur if you choose to litigate. Nevertheless, the ramifications of the MFCU's false 
accusations against me are of such serious nature that it would very likely irreparably 
impair my continuing the practice of medicine if left unchallenged. 
If you will not dismiss this action, or refer your findings back to the Utah Health Care 
Finance Administration for evaluation and non-criminal resolution between that Agency 
and myself, I have no reasonable alternative but to await your filing of charges before the 
proper court where I am confident to have a fair hearing of the matter in controversy. 
Taj N. Becker, MJD. 
Sent, certified mail with return receipt requested *7 -"? - ? ^ 
BECKER 0386 
ADDENDUM "C 
•^ \Wt<* frrfot/J*<*/ 
&m9*QhJ£i Utah 
Department 
of Health 
Coverage 
and 
Reimbursement 
Policy 
Medicaid 
Program Integrity Unit 
Operations Manual 
February 2001 
0 0 0,0.1 
At the earliest practical time, advise MFCU of any matter with resp'ect to which 
DHCF has suspicion of fraud, patient abuse, patient neglect or patient exploitation. 
Cooperate with MFCU to establish a case-specific plan for coordinating action with 
respect to any matter in which MFCU is undertaking an investigation into allegations 
offraud, patient abuse, patient neglect or patient exploitation. If MFCU requests that 
DHCF refer any such matter to MFCU for investigation and possible prosecution, 
DHCF shall comply with that request. 
Pursuant to 42 CFR §455.21 (a)(2), if MFCU determines that it may be useful in 
carrying out MFCU's responsibilities, DCHF shall promptly comply with any 
reasonable request from MFCU for (a) access to, and free copies of, any records or 
information kept by the agency or its contractors; (b) computerized data stored by the 
agency or its contractors. These data must be supplied without charge and in the 
form requested by MFCU. DHCF shall provide MFCU with any records or 
information kept by a provider of services pursuant to § 1902(a)(27) of the Social 
Security Act, 42 CFR § 431.107, §431.115, Subpart E § 424.50, et seq., DHCF's 
regulations, or the Medicaid provider agreements as may be in the possession of 
DHCF and deemed necessary in carrying out its responsibilities under Title XIX of 
the Social Security Act. Further, MFCU may request such records or information 
which it reasonably determines to be necessary in the detection, investigation, or 
prosecution of fraud, patient abuse, patient neglect or patient exploitation, DHCF 
designates MFCU and its personnel as duly authorized agents of DHCF for purposes 
of reasonable or immediate access as defined in the Provider Agreement for 
Medicaid and UMAP, to provider records and facilities for detection, investigation, 
or prosecution of fraud or patient abuse, neglect or exploitation. 
DHCF shall make its employees available to MFCU without charge to advise MFCU 
on matters relating to MFCU investigations on a schedule agreed upon by the parties, 
and to testify at trials. 
DHCF will cooperate as requested with the criminal investigation of any case 
referred to MFCU. DHCF recognizes that MFCU will be undertaking, as part of 
its responsibilities, investigations offraud, patient abuse, patient neglect or patient 
exploitation on the basis of information obtained independent of any referral from 
DHCF. DHCF recognizes that these investigations are an inherent part of MFCU's 
responsibilities and will provide these investigations the same degree of assistance 
as it would in any investigation initiated by referral from DHCF. 
Whenever DHCF plans to undertake an administrative action to recover an 
overpayment or to establish abuse in the provision of medical services involving a 
provider that is under investigation for fraud, patient abuse, neglect or exploitation, 
DHCF will consult with MFCU to ensure that the planned administrative action is 
coordinated with MFCU. This shall include the following steps: 
1. Details of the planned administrative action shall be made by DHCF to 
MFCU for review, including any additional information developed by DHCF 
which may be germane to MFCU's action. Following such referral, DHCF 
shall hold the matter in abeyance for a period of at least thirty (30) days to 
permit MFCU review. 
2. All administrative settlements, sanctions and decisions of DHCF must 
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ADDENDUM "D 
J. DENIS KROLL - 1858 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM - 1231 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
5272 College Drive, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Telephone: 801-284-6253 
Date /Hi-fa Time <&3Q 
Location /)/? &&.*t=e*> c^r=irF-
3TCtsciu-i= .t IT 
Upon JML2MJ2£££g£ 
Utah Department of Public Safety 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF A 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
NO, s <7^^a 
THE STATE C? UTAH TO: 
TAJ N 3ECXER, M.D. 
A n c h o r P r o f e s s i o n a l S e r v i c e s 
620 S o u t n 400 E a s t , #10i 
Georcre U t a h 84770 
T h i s i s a c o n f i d e n t i a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n and y o u a r e r e q u e s t e d 
n e t t o d i s c l o s e t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h i s S u b p o e n a t o a n y o n e . 
YOU MAY SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS SUBPOENA BY 
DELIVERING THE INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS REQUESTED TO THE 
OFFICER/AGENT SERVING THIS SUBPOENA UPON YOU, 
You are hereby commanded to set aside all business and 
excuses and appear at the Office of the Attorney General of the 
State of Utah, Bureau of Medicaid Fraud, 5272 College Drive, 
Murray, Utah 84123, at the hour of a.m., on Monday , 
the 23rd day of November , 1998, to give testimony in 
supjppyt of a criminal investigation. You are entitled to be 
represented by legal counsel at the time of this examination. 
You are also commanded to bring with you the following 
documents and all records pertaining thereto: 
SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT A 
This subpoena is authorized by order of the District Court. 
DATED this day of ) llTtt^K^^ 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney Genera]/ 
J . / D E N I S KROLL 
; Assistant Attorney General 
"'Attorneys for State of Utah 
WITNESS : THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF THE THIRD JUDICI ALJH STRICT 
COURT j./} andj for SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, this S T d a y of 
, 1998. 
| ATTEST my hand and the seal of said Court the day and year 
last above written. /^T-
DEPUTY"* 2LER.K..,: 
